

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS

Terrorism has been a dark feature of human behavior since history was first recorded. Great leaders have been assassinated, groups and individuals have committed acts of incredible violence, and entire cities and nations have been put to the sword—all in the name of defending a greater good.

The modern era of terrorism is primarily, though not exclusively, a conflict between adversaries waging, on one side, a self-described war on terrorism and, on the other, a self-described holy war in defense of their religion. It is an active confrontation, evidenced by the fact that the incidence of significant terrorist attacks often spikes to serious levels. Although such trends are disturbing, it is critical for one to keep these facts in perspective because the modern terrorist environment is in no manner a unique circumstance in human history.

It will become clear in the following pages that the history of terrorist behavior extends into antiquity and that themes and concepts recur. State terrorism, dissident terrorism, and other types of political violence are common to all periods of civilization. It will also become clear to readers that certain *justifications*—rooted in basic beliefs—have been used to rationalize terrorist violence throughout history. The following themes are introduced here:

- Historical Perspectives on Terrorism
- Ideological Origins of Terrorism
- September 11, 2001, and the New Terrorism

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM

It is perhaps natural for each generation to view history narrowly, from within its own political context. Contemporary commentators

Learning Objectives

This chapter will enable readers to do the following:

1. Demonstrate knowledge of the historical context of modern terrorist violence.
2. Understand the classical ideological continuum.
3. Classify some ideologies and activism as left-wing phenomena.
4. Explain the attributes and behavior of left-wing terrorism.
5. Classify some activism and extremism as right-wing phenomena.
6. Explain the attributes and behavior of right-wing terrorism.

and laypersons tend to interpret modern events as though they have no historical precedent. However, terrorism is by no means a modern phenomenon and has in fact a long history. Nor does terrorism arise from a political vacuum.

Antiquity

In the ancient world, cases and stories of state repression and political violence were common. Several ancient writers championed **tyrannicide** (the killing of tyrants) as necessary for the greater good of the citizenry and to delight the gods. Some assassins were honored by the public. For example, after Aristogeiton and Harmodius were executed for assassinating the Greek tyrant Hipparchus, statues were erected to honor them.¹ Conquerors often set harsh examples by exterminating entire populations or forcing the conquered into exile. An example of this practice is the Babylonian Exile, which followed the conquest of the kingdom of Judea. Babylon's victory resulted in the forced removal of the Judean population to Babylon in 598 and 587 BCE. Those in authority also repressed the expression of ideas from individuals they deemed dangerous, sometimes violently. In ancient Greece, Athenian authorities sentenced the great philosopher Socrates to death in 399 BCE for allegedly corrupting the city-state's youth and meddling in religious affairs. He drank hemlock and died among his students and followers.

The Roman Age

During the time of the Roman Empire, the political world was rife with many violent demonstrations of power, which were arguably examples of what we would now term *state terrorism*. These include the brutal suppression of Spartacus's followers after the Servile War of 73–71 BCE, after which the Romans crucified surviving rebels along the Appian Way. **Crucifixion** was a common form of public execution: The condemned were affixed to a cross or other wooden frame, either tied or nailed through the wrist or hand, and later died by suffocation as their bodies sagged.

Warfare was waged in an equally hard manner, such as the final conquest of the North African city-state of Carthage in 146 BCE. The city was reportedly allowed to burn for 10 days, the rubble was cursed, and salt was symbolically plowed into the soil to signify that Carthage would forever remain desolate. During another successful campaign in 106 CE, the Dacian nation (modern Romania) was eliminated, its population was enslaved, and many Dacians perished in gladiatorial games. In other conquered territories, conquest was often accompanied by similar demonstrations of terror, always with the intent to demonstrate that Roman rule would be wielded without mercy against those who did not submit to the authority of the empire. Julius Caesar claimed in his *Commentarii de Bello Gallico*² to have exterminated Germanic tribes numbering 430,000 people at the Rhine river in 55 BCE during his conquest of Gaul. In essence, Roman conquest was predicated on the alternatives of unconditional surrender by adversaries or their annihilation.

Regicide (the killing of kings) was also fairly common during the Roman period. Perhaps the best known was the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE by rivals in the Senate. Other Roman emperors also met violent fates: Caligula and Galba were killed by

the Praetorian Guard in 41 and 68 CE, respectively; Domitian was stabbed to death in 96 CE; a paid gladiator murdered Commodus in 193 CE; and Caracalla, Elagabalus, and other emperors either were assassinated or died suspiciously.³

The Ancient and Medieval Middle East

Cases exist of movements in the ancient and medieval Middle East that used what modern analysts would consider to be terrorist tactics. For example, in the *History of the Jewish War*—a seven-volume account of the first Jewish rebellion against Roman occupation (66–73 CE)—the historian Flavius Josephus described how one faction of the rebels, the **Sicarii** (who took their name from their preferred weapon, the *sica*, a short curved dagger), attacked both Romans and members of the Jewish establishment.⁴ They were masters of guerrilla warfare and the destruction of symbolic property and belonged to a group known as the **Zealots** (from the Greek *zelos*, meaning ardor or strong spirit), who opposed the Roman occupation of Palestine. The modern term *zealot*, used to describe uncompromising devotion to radical change, is derived from the name of this group. Assassination was a commonly used tactic. Some Sicarii Zealots were present at the siege of Masada, a hilltop fortress that held out against the Romans for 3 years before the defenders committed suicide in 74 CE rather than surrender.

The Dark Ages

During the period from the Assassins (13th century) to the French Revolution (18th century), behavior that would later be considered terrorism was commonly practiced in medieval warfare. In fact, a great deal of medieval conflict involved openly brutal warfare. However, the modern terrorist profile of politically motivated dissidence attempting to change an existing order, or state repression to preserve state hegemony, was uncommon. Nation states in the modern sense did not exist in medieval Europe, and recurrent warfare was motivated by religious intolerance and political discord between feudal kings and lords. The post-Assassin Middle East also witnessed periodic invasions, discord between leaders, and religious warfare but not modern-style terrorism. It was not until the rise of the modern nation state in the mid-17th century that the range of intensity of conflict devolved from open warfare to include behavior that the modern era would define as insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism.

A particularly relevant and prescient case from England is a conspiracy led by Guy Fawkes to bomb the Palace of Westminster and assassinate the king and members of Parliament in 1605. Chapter Perspective 2.1 discusses this conspiracy, known as the Gunpowder Plot.

The French Revolution: Prelude to Modern Terrorism

During the French Revolution, British statesman and philosopher **Edmund Burke** coined the word *terrorism* in its modern context. He used the word to describe *La Terreur*, commonly known in English as the **Reign of Terror** (June 1793 to July 1794).⁵ The Reign of Terror, led by the radical Jacobin-dominated government, is a good

CHAPTER PERSPECTIVE 2.1

The Gunpowder Plot of Guy Fawkes

The reign of James I, King of England from 1603 to 1625, took place in the aftermath of a religious upheaval. During the previous century, King Henry VIII (1509–1547) wrested from Parliament the authority to proclaim himself the head of religious affairs in England. King Henry had requested permission from Pope Clement VII to annul his marriage to Catherine of Aragon when she failed to give birth to a male heir to the throne. His intention was to then marry Anne Boleyn. When the pope refused his request, Henry proclaimed the Church of England and separated the new church from papal authority. The English crown confiscated Catholic Church property and shut down Catholic monasteries. English Catholics who failed to swear allegiance to the crown as supreme head of the Church were repressed by Henry and later by Queen Elizabeth I (1558–1603).

When James I was proclaimed king, Guy Fawkes and other conspirators plotted to

assassinate him. They meticulously smuggled gunpowder into the Palace of Westminster, intending to blow it up along with King James and any other officials in attendance on the opening day of Parliament. Unfortunately for Fawkes, one of his fellow plotters attempted to send a note to warn his brother-in-law to stay away from Westminster on the appointed day. The note was intercepted, and Fawkes was captured on November 5, 1605, while guarding the store of gunpowder.

Guy Fawkes suffered the English penalty for treason. He was dragged through the streets, hanged until nearly dead, his bowels were drawn from him, and he was cut into quarters—an infamous process known as hanging, drawing, and quartering. Fawkes had known that this would be his fate, so when the noose was placed around his neck he took a running leap, hoping to break his neck. Unfortunately, the rope broke, and the executioner proceeded with the full ordeal.

example of state terrorism carried out to further the goals of a revolutionary ideology.⁶ During the Reign of Terror, thousands of opponents to the Jacobin dictatorship—and others merely perceived as enemies of the new revolutionary Republic—were arrested and put on trial before the **Revolutionary Tribunal**. Those found to be enemies of the Republic were beheaded by a new instrument of execution—the guillotine. With the capability to execute victims one after the other in assembly-line fashion, it was regarded by Jacobins and other revolutionaries of the time as an enlightened and civilized tool of revolutionary justice.⁷

The ferocity of the Reign of Terror is reflected in the number of victims. Between 17,000 and 40,000 persons were executed, and perhaps 200,000 political prisoners died in prisons from disease and starvation.⁸ Two incidents illustrate the communal nature of this violence. In Lyon, 700 people were massacred by cannon fire in the town square. In Nantes, thousands were drowned in the Loire River when the boats they were detained in were sunk.⁹ The Revolutionary Tribunal, a symbol of revolutionary justice and state terrorism, has its modern counterparts in 20th-century social upheavals. Recent examples

include the **struggle meetings** of revolutionary China (public criticism sessions, involving public humiliation and confession) and revolutionary Iran's Islamic Revolution Committees, also known as **komitehs** (ad hoc tribunals that enforced Islamic laws).¹⁰

Nineteenth-Century Europe: Two Examples From the Left

Modern left-wing terrorism is not a product of the 20th century. Its ideological ancestry dates to the 19th century, when anarchist and communist philosophers began to advocate the destruction of capitalist and imperial society—what **Karl Marx** referred to as the “spectre . . . haunting Europe.”¹¹ Some revolutionaries readily encouraged the use of terrorism in the new cause. One theorist, **Karl Heinzen** in Germany, anticipated the late-20th-century fear that terrorists might obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) when he supported the acquisition of new weapons technologies to destroy the enemies of the people. According to Heinzen, these weapons should include poison gas and new high-yield explosives.¹²

During the 19th century, several terrorist movements championed the rights of the lower classes. These movements were prototypes for 20th-century groups and grew out of social and political environments unique to their countries. To illustrate this point, two examples are drawn from early industrial England and from semifeudal Russia.

The **Luddites** were English workers in the early 1800s who objected to the social and economic transformations of the Industrial Revolution. Their principal objection was that industrialization threatened their jobs, and thus they targeted the machinery of the new textile factories. They attacked, for example, stocking looms that mass-produced stockings at the expense of skilled stocking weavers who made them by hand.

A mythical figure, Ned Ludd, was the supposed founder of the Luddite movement. The movement was active from 1811 to 1816 and was responsible for sabotaging and destroying wool and cotton mills and weaving machinery. The British government eventually suppressed the movement by passing anti-Luddite laws, including establishing the crime of “machine breaking,” which was punishable by death. After 17 Luddites were executed in 1813, the movement gradually died out. Although historians debate whether Luddites clearly fit the profile of terrorists, modern antitechnology activists and terrorists, such as the **Unabomber, Theodore “Ted” Kaczynski**, in the United States, are sometimes referred to as neo-Luddites.

People's Will (Narodnaya Volya) in Russia was a direct outgrowth of student dissatisfaction with the czarist regime in the late 19th century. Many young Russian university students, some of whom had studied abroad, became imbued with the ideals of anarchism and Marxism. Many became radical reformists who championed the rights of the people, particularly the peasant class. A populist revolutionary society, Land and Liberty (Zemlya Volya), was founded in 1876 with the goal of fomenting a mass peasant uprising by settling radical students among them to raise their class consciousness. After a series of arrests and mass public trials, Land and Liberty split into two factions in 1879. One faction, Black Repartition, kept to the goal of a peasant revolution. The other, People's Will, fashioned itself into a conspiratorial terrorist organization.

People's Will members believed that they understood the underlying problems of Russia better than the uneducated masses of people did and concluded that they were

therefore better able to force government change. This was, in fact, one of the first examples of a revolutionary **vanguard strategy**, in which People's Will believed that they could both demoralize the czarist government and expose its weaknesses to the peasantry. Group members quickly embarked on a terrorist campaign against carefully selected targets. Incidents of terror committed by People's Will members—and other revolutionaries who emulated them—included shootings, knifings, and bombings targeting government officials. In one successful attack, Czar Alexander II was assassinated by a terrorist bomb on March 1, 1881. The immediate outcome of the terrorist campaign was the installation of a repressive police state in Russia that, although not as efficient as later police states would be in the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, succeeded in harassing and imprisoning most members of People's Will.

The Modern Era

David C. Rapoport designed a theory holding that modern terrorism has progressed through three waves that lasted for roughly 40 years each and that we now live in a fourth wave. His four waves are as follows:

1. the anarchist wave: 1880s to the end of World War I
2. the anticolonial wave: end of World War I until the late 1960s
3. the New Left wave: late 1960s to the near present
4. the religious wave: about 1980 until the present

It is useful in developing a critical understanding of modern extremist behavior to understand that the modern threat of the New Terrorism adds a unique dimension to the terrorist environment of the 21st century. This is because “the new terrorism is different in character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population.”¹³

The new breed of terrorists “would feel no compunction over killing hundreds of thousands if they had the means to do so.”¹⁴ In addition, the modern environment is characterized by a horizontal organizational arrangement wherein independent cells operate autonomously without reporting to a hierarchical (vertical) command structure. There have been many serious terrorist strikes such as those in Madrid, Spain; Bali, Indonesia; London, England; Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt; Paris, France; Brussels, Belgium; and Orlando, United States. Many of these new terrorists are motivated by religious or nationalist precepts that do not fit easily into the classical ideological continuum discussed in the next section.

IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF TERRORISM

Ideologies are systems of belief derived from theories that explain human social and political conditions. Literally scores of belief systems have led to acts of terrorist violence. Because there are so many belief systems, it is difficult to classify them with precision. Nevertheless, a **classical ideological continuum** rooted in the politics of the French

Revolution has endured to the present time.¹⁵ This is instructive for our discussion of politically motivated violence because the concepts embodied in the continuum have continued and will continue to be relevant.

The Classical Ideological Continuum: The Case of the French Revolution

At the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789, a parliament-like assembly was convened to represent the interests of the French social classes. Although its name changed during the revolution—from National Constituent Assembly to Legislative Assembly to National Convention—the basic ideological divisions were symbolically demonstrated by where representatives sat during assembly sessions. On the left side of the assembly sat those who favored radical change, some advocating a complete reordering of French society and culture. On the right side of the assembly sat those who favored either the old order or slow and deliberate change. In the center of the assembly sat those who either favored moderate change or simply could not make up their minds to commit to either the left or right. These symbolic designations—**left, center, and right**—have become part of our modern political culture.

Table 2.1 summarizes the progression of these designations from their origin during the French Revolution. After the dissolution of the monarchy, the victorious revolutionaries began a complete restructuring of French society. Perhaps the most important priority was to create a new elective constituent assembly to represent the interests of the people. The configuration of this new assembly changed repeatedly as the revolution progressed from one ideological phase to the next.

Table 2.1 The Classical Ideological Continuum: The Case of the French Revolution

Legislative Body	Political and Ideological Orientation		
	Left	Center	Right
National Constituent Assembly 1789–1791	Patriots (republicans)	Moderates (constitutional monarchists)	Blacks (reactionaries)
Legislative Assembly 1791–1792	Mountain (republicans)	Plain (near-republicans)	Constitutionalists (constitutional monarchists)
National Convention 1792	Mountain (radicals)	Marsh (uncommitted bourgeois)	Girondins (bourgeois republicans)

It is readily apparent from the French Revolution that the quality of the classical continuum depended very much on the political environment of each society. For example, in American culture, mainstream values include free enterprise, freedom of speech, and limited government.¹⁶ Depending on where one falls on the continuum, the interpretation can be very different. Thus, the continuum summarizes the conventional political environment of the modern era. Many nationalist or religious terrorists, however, do not fit easily into the classical continuum. For example, “to argue that the Algerian terrorists, the Palestinian groups, or the Tamil Tigers are ‘left’ or ‘right’ means affixing a label that simply does not fit. The Third World groups have subscribed to different ideological tenets at different periods.”¹⁷

Nevertheless, the continuum is still useful for categorizing terrorist behaviors and extremist beliefs. Activism on the left, center, and right can be distinguished by a number of characteristics. A comparison of these attributes is instructive. Table 2.2 compares the championed groups, methodologies, and desired outcomes of typical political environments.

An Ideological Analysis: From the Extreme Left to the Extreme Right

Ideology of the **fringe left** is usually an extreme interpretation of Marxist ideology, using theories of class warfare or ethno-nationalist liberation to justify political violence. At the leftist fringe, violence is seen as a perfectly legitimate option because the group considers itself at war with an oppressive system, class, or government. The key justification is the notion of the group as a righteous champion of the poor and downtrodden.

This type of ideological movement frequently concerns itself only with destroying an existing order in the name of the championed class or national group, not with building the new society in the aftermath of the revolution. For example, **Gudrun Ensslin**, a leader of the terrorist Red Army Faction (RAF) in West Germany, stated, “As for the state of the

Table 2.2 The Classical Ideological Continuum: Modern Political Environments

	Left Fringe	Far Left	Liberalism	Moderate Center	Conservatism	Far Right	Fringe Right
Championed groups	Class or nationality	Class or nationality	Demographic groups	General society	General society	Race, ethnicity, nationality, religion	Race, ethnicity, nationality, religion
Methodology or process	Liberation movement	Political agitation	Partisan democratic processes	Consensus	Partisan democratic processes	Political agitation	“Order” movement
Desired outcome	Radical change	Radical change	Incremental reform	Status quo slow change	Traditional values	Reactionary change	Reactionary change

future, the time after victory, that is not our concern. We build the revolution, not the socialist model.¹⁸

The ideology of the **far left** frequently applies Marxist theory to promote class or ethno-nationalist rights. It is best characterized as a radical world view because political declarations often direct public attention against perceived forces of exploitation or repression. Far-left groups do not necessarily engage in political violence and often fully participate in democratic processes. In Western Europe, for example, Communist parties and their affiliated Communist labor unions have historically been overt in agitating for reform through democratic processes.¹⁹ It is important to note that this environment of relatively peaceful coexistence occurs only in societies where dissent is tolerated. In countries with weaker democratic traditions, far-left dissent has erupted in violence and been met by extreme repression. Latin America has many examples of this kind of environment.

The ideology of the **far right** is characterized by strong adherence to social order and traditional values. A chauvinistic racial or ethnic dimension is often present, as is an undercurrent of religion or mysticism (the latter is especially prevalent in the United States). As with the far left, far-right groups do not necessarily engage in political violence and have fully participated in democratic processes. Organized political expression is often overt. For example, right-wing political parties in many European countries are a common feature of national politics. Their success has been mixed, and their influence varies in different countries. In Spain, Greece, and Great Britain, they have little popular support.²⁰ However, those in Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy have enjoyed significant popular support in the recent past.

Not all far-right political movements are the same, and a comparison of the American and European contexts is instructive. In Europe, some rightist parties are nostalgic and neo-fascist, such as the German People's Union. Others are more populist, such as the National Front in France.²¹ In the United States, the far right is characterized by activism among local grassroots organizations such as the Tea Party movement and has no viable political party. Some American groups have a religious orientation, others are racial, others embody a politically paranoid survivalist lifestyle, and some incorporate all three tendencies.

Ideology of the **fringe right** is usually rooted in an uncompromising belief in ethno-nationalist or religious superiority, and terrorist violence is justified as a protection of the purity and superiority of the group. Terrorists on the fringe right picture themselves as champions of an ideal order that has been usurped, or attacked, by inferior interests or unwanted religious values. Violence is an acceptable option against those who are not members of the group because they are considered obstacles to the group's natural assumption of power. For example, in Europe rightist violence is often directed against non-European migrants from the Middle East and Africa.²² Like their counterparts on the fringe left, right-wing terrorists often have only a vague notion of the characteristics of the new order after the revolution. They are concerned only with asserting their value system and, if necessary, destroying the existing order. Significantly, rightist terrorists have been more likely than their leftist counterparts to engage in indiscriminate bombings and other attacks that produce higher numbers of victims. Table 2.3 applies this discussion to the American context. The United States is a good case in point for the application of the classical ideological continuum. Its political environment has produced organizations that represent the ideologies included in the continuum. The representation here compares organizations that have economic, group rights, faith, and legal agendas.

Table 2.3 The Classical Ideological Continuum: The Case of the United States

Left Fringe	Far Left	Liberalism	Moderate Center	Conservatism	Far Right	Fringe Right
Economic or class agenda						
May 19 Communist Organization (M19CO)	Communist Party, USA	American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations	Teamsters Union	Lyndon Larouche groups	Posse Comitatus
Activist or group rights agenda						
Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN) Puertorriqueña	Black Panther Party for Self Defense	National Council of La Raza	National Bar Association	Heritage Foundation	Euro-American Unity and Rights Organization	Aryan Republican Army (ARA)
Religious or faith agenda						
Liberation theology	Catholic Worker movement	American Friends Service Committee	National Conference of Christians and Jews	Southern Baptist Convention	Moral Majority	Army of God
Legal or constitutional agenda						
Individual lawyers	National Lawyers Guild	American Civil Liberties Union	American Bar Association	Thomas More Law Center	American Center for Law and Justice	Freemen

Ideology in Practice: From Anarchism to Fascism

Anarchism

Anarchism is a leftist philosophy that was an ideological by-product of the social upheavals of mid-19th-century Europe, a time when civil unrest and class conflict swept the continent and culminated in the revolutions of 1848. Anarchists were among the first anti-establishment radicals who championed what they considered the downtrodden peasant and working classes. They abhorred central government control and private property. Frenchman **Pierre-Joseph Proudhon**, who published a number of articles and books on the virtues of anarchism, coined an enduring slogan among anarchists: “**Property is theft!**”

The radical undercurrent of anarchist thought began with that proposition. **Mikhail Bakunin** and his philosophical associates, **Sergei Nechayev** and **Petr Kropotkin**, all Russians, were the founders of modern anarchism. They supported destruction of the state, radical decentralization of power, atheism, and individualism. They also opposed capitalism and Karl Marx's revolutionary doctrine of building a socialist state.

Early anarchists never offered a concrete plan for replacing centralized state authority because they had no clearly defined vision of post-revolutionary society. They considered the destruction of the state their contribution to the future.

They advocated achieving propaganda victories by violently pursuing the revolution, which became known as **propaganda by the deed**. Terrorism was advocated as the principal way to destroy state authority. Interestingly, anarchists argued that terrorists should organize themselves into small groups, or cells—a tactic that modern terrorists have adopted.

Anarchists actively practiced propaganda by the deed, as evidenced by the many acts of violence against prominently symbolic targets. In Russia, People's Will conducted a terrorist campaign from 1878 to 1881, and other anarchist terrorist cells operated in Western Europe. Around the turn of the 20th century, anarchists assassinated Russian czar Alexander II, Austro-Hungarian empress Elizabeth, Italian king Umberto I, and French president Marie François Sadi Carnot. An alleged anarchist, Leon Czolgosz, assassinated U.S. president William McKinley.

Radical Socialism

Radical socialism, like anarchism, is a leftist ideology that began in the turmoil of mid-19th-century Europe and the uprisings of 1848. Socialists championed the emerging industrial working class and argued that the wealth produced by these workers should be more equitably distributed rather than concentrated in the hands of the wealthy elite.

Karl Marx is regarded as the founder of modern socialism. He and his associate **Friedrich Engels**, both Germans, argued that their approach to socialism was grounded in the scientific discovery that human progress and social evolution is the result of a series of historical conflicts and revolutions. Each era was based on the working group's unequal relationship to the **means of production** (e.g., slaves, feudal farmers, industrial workers) vis-à-vis the ruling group's enjoyment of the fruits of the working group's labor. In each era, a ruling thesis group maintained the status quo and a laboring antithesis group challenged it (through agitation and revolution), resulting in a socioeconomic synthesis that created new relationships with the means of production. Thus, human society evolved into the next era. According to Marx, the most advanced era of social evolution would be the synthesis Communist era, which he argued would be built after the antithesis industrial working



► Architects of Communism. Russian revolutionary leader Vladimir Ilich Lenin (left) with Leon Trotsky, head of the Red Army and future ideological rival of Joseph Stalin.

class overthrew the thesis capitalist system. Marx theorized that the working class would establish the **dictatorship of the proletariat** in the Communist society and build a just and egalitarian social order.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the class pyramid during the Industrial Age, which Marx considered to be the final age of human society prior to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Marx and Engels collaborated on the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, a short work completed in 1847 and published in 1848. It became one of the most widely read documents of the 20th century. In it, Marx and Engels explained the revolutionary environment of the industrial era and how this era was an immediate precursor to the Communist era.


Marxist socialism was pragmatic, revolutionary, and action oriented, and many revolutionary leaders and movements throughout the 20th century adopted it. Terrorism, both state and dissident, was used during the revolutions and the consolidations of power after victory. It is interesting to note that none of these Marxist revolutions was led by the industrial working class; all occurred in preindustrial developing nations, often within the context of anticolonial warfare waged by peasants and farmers.

Chapter Perspective 2.2 summarizes the Marxist-influenced political philosophies of the New Left, which arose in Western countries during the 1960s.

Fascism

Fascism was a rightist ideological counterpoint to **Marxism** and anarchism that peaked before World War II. Like Marxism and anarchism, fascism's popular appeal grew out of social turmoil in Europe, this time as a reaction to the 1917 Bolshevik (Communist) Revolution in Russia, the subsequent Bolshevik-inspired political agitation elsewhere in Europe, and the widespread unrest during the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was rooted in a brand of extreme nationalism that championed the alleged superiority of a

Figure 2.1 Marx: The Industrial Age Class Pyramid



CHAPTER PERSPECTIVE 2.2

Required Reading on the “New Left”

In the postwar West, many leftist terrorists were inspired not by orthodox Marxism but by examples of revolutionaries in the developing world such as Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara. Realizing as a practical matter that building guerrilla units in the countryside was impossible—and that the working class was not sufficiently prepared for revolution—many young radicals became nihilistic dissident revolutionaries. They concluded that revolution was a goal in itself, and “revolution for the hell of it”^a became a slogan and a practice for many left-wing radicals in the West. For them, there was little vision of what kind of society would be built on the rubble of the old. In fact,

The central question about the rationality of some terrorist organizations, such as the West German groups of the 1970s or the Weather Underground in the United States, is whether or not they had a sufficient grasp of reality . . . to calculate the likely consequences of the courses of action they chose.^b

Nevertheless, from the perspective of radical activists and intellectuals, nihilist dissident behavior was rational and logical.

Several books inspired radical leftists in the West. These books provided a rational justification for revolutionary agitation against democratic institutions in relatively prosperous societies. They came to define the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s, which rejected the rigid ideological orthodoxy of the “Old Left” Marxists. They created a new interpretation of revolutionary conditions. On the short list of “required

reading” among radical activists were three books:^c

- Frantz Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth*,
- Herbert Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man*, and
- Carlos Marighella’s *Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*.

The Wretched of the Earth

In *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon analyzed the role of indigenous people living in countries controlled by imperial governments that exploited local resources and imposed a foreign culture and values. He concluded that revolutionary violence was perfectly justifiable under these conditions. In fact, it was required because, in addition to liberating one’s country, one had to liberate oneself as an individual; only “liberating violence” could do this. Young radicals in the West agreed with this analysis, and some concluded that liberating violence in a prosperous society was justified. They also rationalized their violent political behavior by establishing a sense of revolutionary solidarity with “the wretched of the earth.”

One-Dimensional Man

Marcuse was a German philosopher who, along with Jean-Paul Sartre, was prominent among existentialist writers. He argued in *One-Dimensional Man* that capitalist society—no matter how prosperous or democratic—created “manacles” of privilege that kept the public docile and content. He explained that the people’s oppression should be measured by how much they had been co-opted by the accoutrements

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of capitalist comfort. Using this analysis, middle-class college students who considered themselves to be Marxists could justify revolutionary activism, even though they were far removed from the working class. Thus, they were rejecting their “manacles” of privilege and fighting in common cause with other revolutionaries worldwide.

Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla

As we will discuss in Chapter 3, Carlos Marighella’s book was extremely influential on leftist revolutionary strategy in Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States. It was a blueprint for revolution in urban societies, and Marighella’s guidelines for using urban terrorism to create revolutionary conditions were widely followed. However, as noted previously,

the assumption that the exploited group would join the revolution at the right time rarely happened in practice.

These works of dissident philosophy shaped the ideological justifications for the tactics of many revolutionary movements. For example, the motivation behind West Germany’s RAF has been described as having three central elements. These elements reflect the revolutionary literature and theory of the time.^d They were

- the concept of the “armed struggle” and the model of Third World liberation movements . . .
- the Nazi “connection” and “formal democracy” in the Federal Republic . . . [and]
- the rejection of consumer society.^e

- a. The title of a book by the American New Left radical Abbie Hoffman. See Hoffman, Abbie. *Revolution for the Hell of It*. New York: Dell, 1968.
- b. Reich, Walter. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1990, p. 9.
- c. Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove, 1963; Marcuse, Herbert. *One-Dimensional Man*. Boston: Beacon, 1964; Marighella, Carlos. *Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*. Chapel Hill, NC: Documentary Publications, 1985.
- d. Marighella, *Mini-Manual*.
- e. Pridham, Geoffrey. “Terrorism and the State in West Germany during the 1970s: A Threat to Stability or a Case of Political Over-reaction?” In *Terrorism: A Challenge to the State*, edited by Juliet Lodge. Oxford, UK: Martin Robinson, 1981. Quoted in Whittaker, David J., ed. *The Terrorism Reader*. New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 189–91.

particular national heritage or ethno-racial group. Fascism was anti-Communist, anti-monarchist, antidemocratic, and anti-intellectual (though there were some fascist writers). It demanded extreme obedience to law, order, and the state. Fascism also required cultural **conservatism**—often looking backward in history to link the ancient past to the modern state. Fascists created their own conceptualizations of traditional values such as military duty, the Christian Church, and motherhood. Strong antidemocratic leadership was centralized in the state, usually under the guidance of a single charismatic leader who

symbolically embodied the virtues of the state, the people, and the underlying fascist ideology.

Italian dictator **Benito Mussolini** was the first to consolidate power and create a fascist state. Beginning with his March on Rome in 1922, he gradually eliminated all opposition and democratic institutions. He was a mentor to **Adolf Hitler**, who led the fascist National Socialist German Worker's (Nazi) Party to power in Germany in 1933. Both the Italian and German fascist regimes sent troops to fight on the side of right-wing Spanish rebels led by **Francisco Franco** during the Spanish Civil War.²³

Although the first fascist movement largely collapsed in 1945, right-wing groups and political parties have continued to promote neofascist ideals. Some terrorist groups in Europe and the United States have been overtly fascist and racist. Dictatorships have also arisen since World War II that adopted many features of prewar fascism. For example, Latin American regimes arose in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and El Salvador—to name a few—that fit the fascist pattern.

The Just War Doctrine

The **just war doctrine** is an ideal and a moralistic philosophy rather than an ideology. The concept has been used by ideological and religious extremists to justify acts of extreme violence. Throughout history, nations and individuals have gone to war with the belief that their cause was just and their opponents' cause unjust. Similarly, attempts have been made for millennia to write fair and just laws of war and rules of engagement. For example, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the **Hague Convention** produced at least 21 international agreements on the rules of war.²⁴

The just war debate asks who can morally be defined as an enemy and what kinds of targets it is morally acceptable to attack. In this regard,

there are two separate components to the concept of just war (which philosophers call the just war tradition): the rationale for initiating the war (war's ends) and the method of warfare (war's means). Criteria for whether a war is just are divided into *jus ad bellum* (justice of war) and *jus in bello* (justice in war) criteria.²⁵

Thus, **jus in bello** is correct behavior while waging war, and **jus ad bellum** is having the correct conditions for waging war in the first place. These concepts have been debated by philosophers and theologians for centuries. The early Christian philosopher **Saint Augustine** concluded in the 5th century that war is justified to punish injuries inflicted by a nation that has refused to correct wrongs committed by its citizens. The Christian religious tradition, especially the Roman Catholic Church, has devoted a great



► Architects of fascism. Italian Duce Benito Mussolini (front left) stands beside German Führer Adolf Hitler.

Table 2.4 A Comparison of Ideologies

	Ideological Orientation			
	Anarchism	Radical Socialism	Fascism	Just War
Proponents	Proudhon, Bakunin	Marx, Engels	Mussolini, Hitler	Saint Augustine
Desired social outcome	Stateless society	Dictatorship of the proletariat	New order	Legitimized conflict
Applications	Narodnaya Volya	Russian Revolution	WWII-era Italy and Germany	State and dissident violence

Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images News/Getty Images



► Antifascist protesters rally against a Unite the Right demonstration in Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017.

deal of intellectual effort to clarifying Augustine’s concept. Saint Augustine was, of course, referring to warfare between nations and cities, and Church doctrine long held that an attack against state authority was an offense against God.²⁶ Likewise, the Hague Convention dealt only with rules of conflict between nations and afforded no legal rights to spies or antistate rebels. Neither system referred to rules of engagement for nonstate or antistate conflicts.

In the modern era, both dissidents and states have adapted the just war tradition to their political environments. Antistate conflict and reprisals by states are commonplace. Dissidents always consider their cause just and their methods proportional to the force the agents of their oppressors use. Antiterrorist reprisals launched by states are also justified as appropriate and proportional applications of force—in this case as a means to root out bands of terrorists.

Rules of war and the just war tradition are the result of many motivations. Some rules and justifications are self-serving, others are pragmatic, and others are grounded in ethno-nationalist or religious traditions. Hence, the just war concept can be easily adapted to justify ethnic, racial, national, and religious extremism in the modern era.

Social conflict in the 20th century was deeply rooted in the application of ideals and ideologies to practice. The adoption of these social and philosophical systems frequently inspired individuals and motivated movements to engage in armed conflict with perceived enemies. Table 2.4 matches proponents, outcomes, and case studies of four ideals and ideologies.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AND THE NEW TERRORISM

The death of **Al Qaeda** leader Osama bin Laden in May 2011 occurred on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. The attacks were seen by many as a turning point in the history of political violence. In the aftermath of these attacks, journalists, scholars, and national leaders repeatedly described the emergence of a new international terrorist environment. It was argued that within this new environment, terrorists were now quite capable of using—and very willing to use—WMDs to inflict unprecedented casualties and destruction on enemy targets. These attacks seemed to confirm warnings from experts during the 1990s that a **New Terrorism**,²⁷ using “asymmetrical” methods, would characterize the terrorist environment in the new millennium.

September 11, 2001

One of the worst incidents of modern international terrorism occurred in the United States on the morning of September 11, 2001. It was carried out by 19 Al Qaeda terrorists who were on a suicidal “martyrdom mission.” They committed the attack to strike at symbols of American (and Western) interests in response to what they perceived to be a continuing process of domination and exploitation of Muslim countries. They were religious terrorists fighting in the name of a holy cause against perceived evil emanating from the West. Their sentiments were born in the religious, political, and ethnonationalist ferment that has characterized the politics of the Middle East for much of the modern era.

Nearly 3,000 people were killed in the attack. The sequence of events occurred as follows:

7:59 a.m. American Airlines Flight 11, carrying 92 people, leaves Boston’s Logan International Airport for Los Angeles.

8:14 a.m. United Airlines Flight 175, carrying 65 people, leaves Boston for Los Angeles.

8:20 a.m. American Airlines Flight 77, carrying 64 people, takes off from Washington’s Dulles Airport for Los Angeles.

8:42 a.m. United Airlines Flight 93, carrying 44 people, leaves Newark (New Jersey) International Airport for San Francisco.

8:46 a.m. American Flight 11 crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center.

9:03 a.m. United Flight 175 crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Center.

9:37 a.m. American Flight 77 crashes into the Pentagon. Trading on Wall Street is called off.

9:59 a.m. Two World Trade Center—the south tower—collapses.

10:03 a.m. United Flight 93 crashes 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

10:28 a.m. One World Trade Center—the north tower—collapses.²⁸

The United States had previously been the target of international terrorism at home and abroad but had never suffered a strike on this scale on its territory. The most analogous historical event was the Japanese attack on the naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. The last time so many people had died from an act of war on American soil was during the Civil War in the mid-19th century.

After the Al Qaeda assault and the subsequent anthrax crisis, American culture shifted away from openness to security. The symbolism of the attack, combined with its sheer scale, drove the United States to war and dramatically changed the American security environment. Counterterrorism in the United States shifted from a predominantly law enforcement mode to a security mode. Measures included unprecedented airport and seaport security, border searches, visa scrutiny, and more intensive immigration procedures. Hundreds of people were administratively detained and questioned during a sweep of persons fitting the profile of the 19 attackers. These detentions set off a debate about the constitutionality of the methods and the fear of many that civil liberties were in jeopardy. In October 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act was passed, granting significant authority to federal law enforcement agencies to engage in surveillance and other investigative work. On November 25, 2002, 17 federal agencies (later increased to 22) were consolidated to form a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

The symbolism of a damaging attack on homeland targets was momentous because it showed that the American superpower was vulnerable to small groups of determined revolutionaries. The Twin Towers had dominated the New York City skyline since 1972. They were a symbol of global trade and prosperity and the pride of the largest city in the United States. The Pentagon, of course, is a unique building that symbolizes American military power, and its location across the river from the nation's capital showed the vulnerability of the seat of government to attack.

On May 30, 2002, a 30-foot-long steel beam, the final piece of debris from the September 11 attack, was ceremoniously removed from Ground Zero in New York City.

The global community has been challenged by the question of how to respond to the modern terrorist environment. Chapter Perspective 2.3 discusses the subject of waging war in the era of the New Terrorism.

The New Terrorist Morality

The morality of terrorism in the latter decades of the 20th century differed from 19th- and early 20th-century anarchist terrorism and other violent movements. The new generation did not share the same moralistic scruples of the previous generation. Terrorism in late 19th- and early 20th-century Russia, for example, was “surgical” in the sense that it targeted specific individuals to assassinate, specific banks to rob, and specific hostages to kidnap. In fact, not only did the **Social Revolutionary Party** in Russia (founded in 1900) engage in an extensive terrorist campaign in the early 20th century, but its tactics actually became somewhat popular because its victims were often government officials who were hated by the Russian people.

The events of September 11, 2001, precipitated a global “war on terrorism” that began with an invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 by U.S. and NATO forces. Chapter Perspective 2.3 discusses the subject of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER PERSPECTIVE 2.3

The Taliban in Afghanistan^a

In August 2021, the Taliban insurgent movement in Afghanistan defeated the Western-supported Afghan government and declared an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the name of its former regime from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban victory was the most recent example of regime change in Afghanistan, and typical of a pattern of insurgency, internecine fighting, and establishing government through force of arms.

The Taliban are an Islamist movement, originating as one of many factions that resisted the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from December 1979 to February 1989. The anti-Soviet insurgency became a *jihād* (holy war) waged by *mujahideen* (holy warriors) from Afghanistan and thousands of non-Afghan foreign fighters. The Taliban was founded by young Pashtun tribesmen who had attended Pakistani madrassas (religious schools). The term *taliban* is Pashto for “students” and the movement considers itself to be defenders of puristic Islam. Saudi national Osama bin Laden also volunteered to wage *jihād* and eventually created the Al-Qaeda network, centered in Afghanistan.

Post-occupation rivalries among *mujahideen* led to 4 years of internecine fighting (1992–1996), eventually becoming stalemated among several warlord-led militias. The Taliban gained in popularity and superiority over other factions by avowedly promising to establish stability and justice under *sharia* Islamic law. They consolidated control over about 90% of the country by 1996, creating the first iteration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

During their 1996–2001 governance, the Taliban applied strict interpretations of *sharia* law, and established a Ministry for the Promotion

of Virtue and Prevention of Vice to enforce the following examples of prohibitions:

- Music and television were forbidden.
- Theft was punished by amputation.
- Adultery was punished by stoning.
- Education was forbidden for women and girls.
- Women were required to wear the *burqa* garment.
- Men were required to grow beards.
- Women could not work outside the home.
- Photographs and images of women and girls could not be displayed.

During this period the Taliban provided safe haven for Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network. The network actively planned and launched terrorist attacks against the West, including the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, the 2000 bombing of the destroyer USS *Cole* in Aden harbor, and the 2001 “9/11” attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The United States and NATO invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, quickly overthrowing the Taliban regime and driving them from population centers. The ostensible mission of the invasion was to end Al-Qaeda’s safe haven and neutralize the network and Taliban. A pro-Western government was established, and a classic guerrilla insurgency and counterinsurgency ensued. The number of U.S. and NATO troops peaked at approximately 140,000 in 2011. Osama bin Laden was killed in Pakistan in 2011, but allied forces remained in Afghanistan to bolster the pro-Western government.

(Continued)

(Continued)

During the war, the Taliban expanded its operations in the countryside, eventually relegating government control to population centers. The insurgents also largely controlled road networks between the population centers as well as a number of border crossings by winter 2020. The United States and NATO extensively armed and trained government forces, and by 2020 Afghan security forces numbered about 300,000. During 2020 the United States entered into direct negotiations with Taliban leaders and brokered an agreement that included a projected withdrawal of allied forces in May 2021. The date was later amended unilaterally by the United States to a projected withdrawal date of September 2021, the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The Afghan government was not a party to the agreement.

In 2021 the Taliban began an offensive against government-held outposts and provincial capitals. During the offensive, the Taliban offered amnesty to government security forces

if they surrendered without fighting. In this way, multiple surrender agreements were brokered and many bases were surrendered with little or no resistance. The Taliban obtained large quantities of materiel, and its ranks were swelled by new volunteers and Afghan sympathizers who had found refuge in Pakistan. Provincial capitals were rapidly seized by the Taliban and the capital of Kabul fell without resistance on August 15, 2021.

The 20-year Western involvement in Afghanistan ended with a chaotic evacuation of embassy personnel and civilians. From the perspective of Western interests, concern arose of plausible scenarios for the revival of Afghanistan as a safe haven for Islamist movements. From the perspective of the *mujahideen*, the Taliban victory inspired Islamist movements internationally who considered them a model for how jihadist perseverance can ultimately result in victory.

a. For good historical and cultural discussions of the Taliban, see Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010. See also Giustozzi, Antonio. *The Taliban at War, 2001–2018*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019.

In contrast, during the post-World War II era, the definitions of who an enemy was, what a legitimate target could be, and which weapons to use became much broader. This redefining of what constitutes a legitimate target, as well as the appropriate means to attack that target, led to a new kind of political violence. Late-20th-century dissident terrorism was “new” in the sense that it was “indiscriminate in its effects, killing and maiming members of the general public . . . , arbitrary and unpredictable . . . , refus[ing] to recognize any of the rules or conventions of war . . . [and] not distinguish[ing] between combatants and non-combatants.”²⁸ Operationally, the new terrorist morality can be spontaneous and quite gruesome. For example, in March 2004, four American private contractors were killed in an ambush in the Iraqi city of Fallujah. Their corpses were burned, dragged through the streets, and then displayed from a bridge. In Iraq and Syria, ISIS recorded and promulgated graphic executions, including the beheadings of several Western civilian prisoners in 2014, and the public burning of a captured Jordanian pilot in 2015. These events were recorded and posted on social media and the Internet.

When terrorists combine this new morality with the ever-increasing lethality of modern weapons, the potential for high casualty rates and terror on an unprecedented scale

is very real. For example, this combination was put into practice during the long-term terrorist suicide campaigns in Israel with the Palestinians' two intifadas in 1987–1993 and 2000–2005. The combination of a new morality and lethality were especially put into practice by Al Qaeda-inspired attacks in September 2001 in the United States, March 2004 in Madrid, and July 2005 in London. It was also put into practice by ISIS-inspired attacks in November 2015 in Paris and March 2016 in Brussels. Should terrorists obtain high-yield weapons—such as chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons—the new morality would provide an ethical foundation for their use.

The New Terrorism

It is clear from human history that terrorism is deeply woven into the fabric of social and political conflict. This quality has not changed, and in the modern world, states and targeted populations are challenged by the New Terrorism, which is characterized by the following:

- loose, cell-based networks with minimal lines of command and control
- desired acquisition of high-intensity weapons and WMDs
- politically vague, religious, or mystical motivations
- asymmetrical methods that maximize casualties
- skillful use of the Internet and **manipulation of the media**

The New Terrorism should be contrasted with traditional terrorism, which is typically characterized by the following:

- clearly identifiable organizations or movements
- use of conventional weapons, usually small arms and explosives
- explicit grievances championing specific classes or ethno-nationalist groups
- relatively “surgical” selection of targets

New information technologies and the Internet create unprecedented opportunities for terrorist groups, and violent extremists have become adept at bringing their wars into the homes of literally hundreds of millions of people. Those who specialize in suicide bombings, car bombs, or mass-casualty attacks correctly calculate that carefully selected targets will attract the attention of a global audience. Thus, cycles of violence not only disrupt normal routines, but they also produce long periods of global awareness. Such cycles can be devastating. For example, during the winter and spring of 2005, Iraqi suicide bombings increased markedly in intensity and frequency, from 69 in April 2005 (a record rate at that time) to 90 in May.²⁹ Likewise, the renewal of sectarian violence in 2014, exacerbated by intensive combat with ISIS as a reinvigoration of the sectarian bloodletting that occurred during the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq in the early 2000s. These attacks resulted in many casualties, including hundreds of deaths, and greatly outpaced the previous cycle of car bombings by more than two to one.

All of these threats offer new challenges for policy makers about how to respond to the behavior of terrorist states, groups, and individuals. The war on terrorism, launched in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, seemed to herald a new resolve to end terrorism. This has proved to be a difficult task. The war has been fought on many levels, as exemplified by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the disruption of terrorist cells on several continents, and counterterrorist campaigns against movements such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State. There have been serious terrorist strikes such as those in Madrid, Spain; Bali, Indonesia; London, England; and Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt. In addition, differences arose within the post-September 11 alliance, creating significant strains. It is clear that the war will be a long-term prospect, likely with many unanticipated events. Table 2.5 reports the scale of violence in 2018 and 2019 for 10 countries with active terrorist environments.

Table 2.5 Ten Countries With the Most Terrorist Incidents

Country	Total Incidents				
	2018	Perc.*	2019	Perc.*	Perc. Chg**
Afghanistan	1,294	16%	1,750	21%	35%
Syria	871	11%	1,028	12%	18%
India	671	8%	655	8%	-2%
Iraq	765	9%	540	7%	-29%
Somalia	526	6%	486	6%	-8%
Nigeria	546	7%	458	6%	-16%
Yemen	224	3%	395	5%	76%
Philippines	350	4%	351	4%	0.3%
Colombia	121	1%	291	4%	140%
Congo (kinshasa)	185	2%	230	3%	24%
Sub-Total	5,553	69%	6,184	74%	11%
Year-End Total	8,094		8,302		3%

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2019*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2020.

*Percent of incidents against the annual total.

**Percent change in number of incidents in 2019 compared with 2018.

DISCUSSION BOX

Total War

This chapter's Discussion Box is intended to stimulate critical debate about the legitimacy of using extreme force against civilian populations.

Total war is "warfare that uses all possible means of attack, military, scientific, and psychological, against both enemy troops and civilians."^a It was the prevailing military doctrine applied by combatant nations during the Second World War and was prosecuted by marshalling a total mobilization of industrial and human resources.

Allied and Axis military planners specifically targeted civilian populations. In the cases of German and Japanese strategists, the war was fought as much against indigenous populations as against opposing armies. The massacres and genocide directed against civilian populations at Auschwitz, Dachau, Warsaw, Lidice, and Nanking—and countless other atrocities—are a dark legacy of the 20th century.

The estimated number of civilians killed during the war is staggering:^b

Belgium	90,000
Britain	70,000
China	20,000,000
Czechoslovakia	319,000
France	391,000
Germany	2,000,000
Greece	391,000

a. Webster's *New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language*, Unabridged, 2nd ed. New York: Publishers Guild, 1966.

b. Mercer, Derrick, ed. *Chronicle of the Second World War*. Essex, UK: Longman Group, 1990, p. 668.

c. Jablonski, Edward. *Flying Fortress*. New York: Doubleday, 1965, p. 285.

Japan	953,000
Poland	6,000,000
Soviet Union	7,700,000
Yugoslavia	1,400,000

An important doctrine of the air war on all sides was widespread bombing of civilian populations in urban areas (so-called saturation bombing) so that the cities of Rotterdam, Coventry, London, Berlin, Dresden, and Tokyo were deliberately attacked. It is estimated that the American atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan killed, respectively, 70,000 and 35,000 people.^c

Discussion Questions

- Are deliberate attacks against civilians legitimate acts of war?
- Were deliberate attacks on civilians during the Second World War acts of terrorism?
- If these attacks were acts of terrorism, were some attacks justifiable acts of terrorism?
- Is there such a thing as justifiable terrorism? Is terrorism *malum in se* or *malum prohibitum*?
- Is the practice of total war by individuals or small and poorly armed groups different from its practice by nations and standing armies? How so or how not?

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter introduced readers to some of the historical and modern attributes of terrorism, with a central theme that terrorism is deeply rooted in the human experience. The impact of extremist ideas on human behavior should not be underestimated because certain historical examples of political violence in some ways parallel modern terrorism.

The relationship between extremist ideas and terrorist events was discussed as a nexus, whereby terrorism is the violent manifestation of extremist beliefs. Ideologies are the belief systems at the root of political violence.

Whether terrorist acts are **mala in se** or **mala prohibita** is often relative. Depending on one's

perspective, gray areas may challenge us to be objective about the true nature of political violence. Most, if not all, nations promote an ideological doctrine to legitimize the power of the state and to convince the people that their systems of belief are worthy of loyalty, sacrifice, and (when necessary) violent defense. Conversely, when a group of people perceives that an alternative ideology or condition should be promoted, revolutionary violence may occur against the defenders of the established rival order. In neither case would those who commit acts of political violence consider themselves unjustified in their actions or label themselves as terrorists.

KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

The following topics were discussed in this chapter and can be found in the Glossary:

Adolf Hitler 41	Ideologies 32	Petr Kropotkin 37
Al Qaeda 43	Jus ad bellum 41	Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 36
Anarchism 36	Jus in bello 41	Propaganda by the deed 37
Benito Mussolini 41	Just war doctrine 41	“Property is theft!” 36
Classical ideological continuum 32	Karl Heinzen 31	Regicide 28
Conservatism 40	Karl Marx 31	Reign of Terror 29
Crucifixion 28	Komitehs 31	Revolutionary Tribunal 30
Dictatorship of the proletariat 38	Left, center, and right 33	Saint Augustine 41
Edmund Burke 29	Luddites 31	Sergei Nechayev 37
Far left 35	Mala in se 50	Sicarii 29
Far right 35	Mala prohibita 50	Social Revolutionary Party 44
Fascism 38	<i>Manifesto of the Communist Party</i> 38	Struggle meetings 31
Francisco Franco 41	Manipulation of the media 47	Theodore “Ted” Kaczynski 31
Friedrich Engels 37	Marxism 38	Total war 49
Fringe left 34	Means of production 37	Tyrannicide 28
Fringe right 35	Mikhail Bakunin 37	Unabomber 31
Gudrun Ensslin 34	New Terrorism 43	Vanguard strategy 32
Hague Convention 41	People’s Will (Narodnaya Volya) 31	Zealots 29

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